The Relationship between Environmental Reporting and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan by Naseer, Mehwish & Rashid, Kashif
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
Chapter 8
The Relationship between Environmental Reporting
and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from
Pakistan
Mehwish Naseer and Kashif Rashid
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75228
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
i     i   i
dditional infor ation is available at the end of the chapter
Abstract
The main purpose of the present research is to empirically scrutinize the relationship 
between corporate governance (CG) characteristics and environmental reporting (ER) (a 
component of corporate social responsibility) of firms in Pakistan, through the lens of 
stakeholder and agency theory. The annual reports of 50 non-financial companies listed 
on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for the years 2014–2015 are content analyzed to com-
pute the companies’ environmental reporting practices. A multifactor model comprising 
of six elements of CG, i.e. board size, board independence, CEO duality, audit commit-
tee independence, proportion of female directors on board and institutional investors is 
used to assess the impact of CG elements on companies’ environmental reporting ini-
tiatives. The results revealed that larger board size, higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board, partition of the dual role of chairman and CEO and 
institutional ownership is associated with greater environmental reporting. The results 
are valuable to both academics and policy makers in Pakistan.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, 
environmental reporting, agency theory, stakeholder theory, Pakistan
1. Introduction
There is an increasing tendency for organizations worldwide to disseminate information 
regarding their social and environmental measures [1]. The concept of corporate environ-
mental responsibility has gained considerable attention as a result of growing concern of 
public over the sustainability of natural environment. This concern has become  particularly 
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 noticeable over the past four decades [2]. In addition the concept of Triple Bottom Line 
Reporting (i.e. reporting regarding economic, environmental and social activities) introduced 
by Elkington [3] during the mid-1990s and global reporting initiative in 2002 gained sub-
stantial attention and has recommended certain guidelines on three dimensions of corporate 
accountability and responsibility, i.e. economic responsibility, social responsibility and envi-
ronmental responsibility.
Parallel to this, corporate governance has enormously engrossed attention in recent years. It 
is generally emphasized that sound corporate governance is associated with enhanced trans-
parency, accountability and plausible disclosure [4–7]. Agency theory and other corporate 
governance guidelines recommend a sound corporate governance structure for an effective 
and transparent disclosure mechanism about the corporations.
Moreover, the notion of sustainable development stipulates firms to be accountable not only 
financially or economically but to be sound and reliable socially and environmentally [8]. 
The strong connection between corporate governance mechanisms and the level of volun-
tary disclosure has been reported by the authors in [9–17]. Likewise, the authors in [18–22] 
documented a significant connection between corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
determinants of corporate governance. Whereas the authors in [2, 23–26] have acknowledged 
that sound corporate governance is associated with enhanced environmental disclosure 
practices.
The literature suggests diverging views regarding association between corporate governance 
and information disclosure. Studies conducted by the authors in [21, 22, 25, 27] suggested that 
larger board leads to more efficient reporting system. On the contrary, the authors in [19, 23] 
found a lack of association between board size and environmental reporting. In addition, the 
authors in [10, 17] suggested a need for a separate leadership structure for enhanced trans-
parency and disclosure whereas, Ho and Wong [9] found a lack of relationship between the 
nondual leadership structure and the level of corporate reporting.
The authors in [14, 20, 25] found a positive association between board independence and envi-
ronmental reporting. Likewise, the authors in [22, 25] endorsed that female directors exhibit 
socially responsible behavior and firms with more female directors tend to disclose more 
information.
Audit committee independence is also documented to be positively associated with corporate 
disclosure practices by Oscar and Juliet [26]. On the other hand, Alhazaimeh et al. [16] found 
no link between audit committee independence and voluntary disclosure. For institutional 
ownership, the authors in [12, 25] reported a positive relationship between institutional own-
ership and environmental reporting. On the contrary, Alhazaimeh et al. [16] argued that effec-
tiveness of board is reduced due to the presence of institutional investors.
CSR has been well examined in Pakistan. The prior studies support the notion that sound 
CSR practices improve the financial performance of firm [28–32] and corporate image [33–35]. 
Likewise, studies conducted by the authors in [20–22] documented a substantial association 
between CG and level of corporate disclosure, but so far limited empirical work has been car-
ried out to analyze whether this also relates to environmental reporting. The key motivation 
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of the current study is to fill up the gap by investigating the impact of corporate governance 
elements on the environmental information disclosure of the companies listed on Pakistan 
Stock Exchange (PSX). The present study is expected to make noteworthy contribution to the 
existing accounting literature by imparting updated information on the extent of environ-
mental reporting practices in Pakistan and by presenting empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between corporate governance characteristics and environmental reporting in the annual 
reports of 50 companies listed on PSX.
The findings suggest a positive association between board size and environmental reporting 
as larger board characterized by more qualified individuals acquires an efficient reporting 
system including ER. It is also found that independent directors effectively monitor board 
activities, stimulate autonomy within board and are positively associated with environmen-
tal disclosure practices. Likewise, separate leadership structure enhances the efficiency of 
board in monitoring management activities and ensures high level of transparency. Finally 
the study proves that institutional investors actively voice their concern over the firm’s strate-
gies and board governance and compel management to reveal more information regarding 
environmental activities.
After the introduction, the rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
corporate governance and environmental reporting nexus. Section 3 presents the literature 
review and explains the hypotheses development. Section 4 shows in detail the research 
methodology followed by the results of the empirical analysis to test the stated hypotheses 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusion, implications, limitations and areas for 
future research.
2. Corporate governance and environmental reporting
“Environment Reporting” offers an opportunity for firms to apprise stakeholders that their 
corporate operations and efforts are environmental friendly. Environmental reporting should 
be embraced by corporation as an opportunity rather than an impediment to the growth of 
business. However, it is a real challenge in a country like Pakistan, where pervasive control 
and command systems invade the governance of country. Regulatory framework often tends 
to target the disciplinary behavior of corporations, instead of providing them with a facili-
tating environment for better compliance on ecological and social standards. Sustainability 
reporting also known as triple bottom-line reporting, corporate social responsibility reporting 
or non-financial reporting addresses the ability of organizations to formally reveal informa-
tion about their economic, social and environmental operations [36]. In this perspective, sus-
tainable approach, i.e. to fulfill the requirements of current generation without compromising 
the capacity of upcoming generations to fulfill their requirements is an emerging concern 
among the global community. In Pakistan, sustainability reporting of which environment 
reporting is a significant category is in its infancy but gradually growing.
Globalization is the process of economic integration of multinational and national companies. 
These include listing of companies at international and national stock exchanges. This cross 
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listing provides investors with opportunities to invest and earn economic gains originating 
from versatile interactions because of higher level of brain storming skills [37].
“Environmental reporting” has been described broadly as reporting by corporations regard-
ing the environmental implications of their activities [38]. Environmental disclosure expands 
the responsibility of the firms beyond the conventional role of imparting financial information 
assuming the broad environmental responsibilities of the firms [39]. Manifesting effective cor-
porate governance practices and maintaining sound environmental performance are among 
the key challenges faced by the organization to ensure its sustainability. In this context, envi-
ronmental reporting can be reckoned as means of ascertaining effective corporate gover-
nance practices that incorporate transparency in its environmental practices. This rigorous 
operationalization of information disclosure in the environmental sphere is also attributed as 
“governance-by-disclosure” [40]. Companies in Pakistan and globally are under more public 
scrutiny than ever before and are obliged to disclose information regarding their environmen-
tal operations. Disclosure on environmental performance helps firms to gain stakeholder’s 
confidence, to evaluate potential risks involved in performing such activities and to moder-
ate the impact of these activities on the environment. It considers impact of their operations 
on the surrounding environment and to reveal the results to multiple stakeholders such as 
employees, consumers, community, regulators, the media and shareholders which become 
critical for the long-lasting sustainability of the organizations [41].
Despite the variations in theoretical frameworks being endorsed, pertinent former literature 
from a broader spectrum has recognized that sound corporate governance is affiliated with 
enhanced level of transparency and plausible reporting [4]. Therefore, sound corporate gov-
ernance practices are considered as accountability catalysts, reducing information asymmetry 
by ascertaining the disclosure needed for meeting the informational requirements of diverse 
stakeholders. The existing literature on disclosure of information provides evidence of num-
ber of theories supporting the disclosure of information by corporations. However, agency 
theory [42] and stakeholder theory [43] have dominated the explanation of corporate gover-
nance. Jensen and Meckling [42] described agency relationship as an agreement where one 
person (the agent) renders some services on behalf of the other party (the principal) and safe-
guards their interest. Certain decision making power may be delegated to agent as a reward 
of these services.
Stakeholder theory has a comprehensive dimension as compared to agency theory as it broad-
ens the notion of principal to all concerned parties rather than just shareholders. This theory 
basically deals with the identification and appreciation of the association between the firm’s 
actions and its influence on various stakeholders [44]. With respect to stakeholder theory, the 
authors in [19, 45] argued that good corporate governance practices enhanced firm–stake-
holder relationship by fostering corporate sustainability. Consistent with the stakeholder 
concept, environmental disclosure serves as a part of the discourse between the company and 
its stakeholders concerning various environmental dimensions [8, 44]. On the basis of above 
discussion and in the context of agency and stakeholder theory, the study asserts that level of 
satisfaction of stakeholders regarding environmental information is associated with greater 
accountability and transparency of the top management.
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3. Literature review and development of hypotheses
The previous studies investigating the extent of corporate voluntary reporting practices are 
of the view that environmental reporting is a significant phenomenon employed by corpora-
tions and is influenced by many corporate governance and firm specific attributes. The pres-
ent review is an endeavor to encircle the multiple determinants of environmental reporting 
and its relationship with corporate governance characteristics. Corporate governance char-
acteristics are manifested and categorized into: (1) board characteristics namely the size of 
board, board composition, role duality and proportion of female directors; (2) board com-
mittee’s characteristics computed by audit committee independence and (3) ownership struc-
ture computed by the percentage of institutional investors. Control variables employed in the 
present study are size of the firm, leverage and profitability. In the sub-sections below, we 
develop hypotheses relevant for CG characteristics.
3.1. Board size and environmental reporting
Board size plays a significant role in monitoring firm performance and is taken into consideration 
mainly from the perspective of agency theory. Agency theory advocates for the smaller board 
size and it is anticipated that smaller board enhances efficiency, results in better coordination 
and effectively monitors the management decisions concerning the information disclosure [46]. 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez [47]asserted that larger board is detrimental to governance 
efficiency. The literature also shows contrary school of thought regarding association between 
board size and information disclosure. According to Xie et al. [48] larger board is character-
ized by more qualified and knowledgeable individuals and acquires a more effective reporting 
procedure and enhanced level of voluntary disclosure including the environmental disclosure.
The authors in [49, 50] argued that larger boards are expected to be dominated by the CEO, 
result in poor communication, ineffective coordination and less decision-making. They sug-
gested that boards having more than seven or eight representatives are likely to be ineffective. 
Yoshikawa and Phan [51] also emphasized that numerous hidden interactions and divergence 
of interest among board members made the larger boards less cohesive resulting in weak 
coordination. In addition, they elaborated that sometimes larger boards are purposely formed 
by CEOs to disperse the power in the boardroom by making the CEO a dominant figure and 
thus reduces the likelihood of integrated actions by board members. Parallel to the theoretical 
expectations the study conducted by Byard et al. [52] using a sample of 1279 firms over the 
years 2000–2002 found a negative association between board size and environmental report-
ing. Hence, from the perspective of agency theory it is hypothesized that the relationship 
between board size and environmental disclosure would be negative:
H
1
:The level of environmental reporting is negatively related to the board size.
3.2. Board independence and environmental reporting
According to the agency theory [53] the presence of independent non-executive directors on 
the board effectively monitors the activities of company, stimulating objectivity and autonomy 
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within the board. Furthermore, the board independence reduces the conflicts of interests among 
the multiple shareholders and the management thus leading to the minimization of agency costs 
[19]. From the perspective of stakeholder theory, independent directors are seen as accountabil-
ity mechanism [18], as they have responsibility for a wider variety of stakeholders [45, 47]. The 
2013 Corporate Governance Code issued by Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP) requires all listed companies to have majority of independent non-executive directors on 
their board, thus facilitating the board to discharge its duties and responsibilities appropriately. 
Regarding the association between independence of board and CSR reporting [13–15, 21, 22, 54] 
empirically found a significant impact of the existence of non-executive independent managers 
on CSR disclosure.
According to Refs. [24, 25, 55] boards having more independent non-executive directors com-
pel managers to take favorable decisions regarding the firm’s environmental performance. 
Moreover, the firms demonstrating active environmental concern proved to have more inde-
pendent directors on their boards. Therefore, we hypothesize a significant positive relation-
ship between the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board and the 
extent of environmental reporting:
H
2
:The level of environmental reporting is positively associated with the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board.
3.3. Practice of separation between the chief executive officer and chairman of the 
board and environmental reporting
Role of CEO has been incorporated as one of the significant factor influencing the corporate 
environmental and social reporting by Adams [56]. It is believed that the “CEO duality” or 
“dominant personality phenomenon”, i.e. the positions of CEO and the chairman held by the 
same person can lessen the efficiency of the board in screening the management activities 
[10, 57]. The 2013 Corporate Governance Code released by the SECP also recommends the 
separate role between the CEO and chairman of the board. The authors in [42, 58, 59] proposed 
discrete leadership structure on the basis of agency theory. Hence, it could be assumed that 
the board independence attained by separate leadership framework will direct to a better and 
effective environmental and social reporting about the companies, thus protecting interest of 
the shareholders.
The literature shows contrary results with regard to the practice of separation between the 
executive manager and the chairman of the board and the level of reporting. Furthermore, the 
authors in [9, 19, 60] found no substantial association between the separate leadership struc-
ture and the level of reporting. Florackis and Ozkan [50] argued that the dual role endorses 
CEO entrenchment by decreasing monitoring efficacy of board. Haniffa and Cooke [10] found 
that role duality is linked with lesser voluntary disclosure. Consistent with the arguments, the 
authors in [17, 45, 52, 61] found a positive association between disclosure and separate leader-
ship framework. Finally, it is anticipated that separate leadership structure will enhance the 
extent of environmental reporting by the firm:
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H
3
:The level of environmental reporting is positively related to the practice of separation between the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman of the board.
3.4. Proportion of female directors on the board and environmental reporting
Board diversity in terms of proportion of women on the board has been documented as hav-
ing a substantial effect on firm performance and disclosure of both financial and nonfinancial 
matters [62]. Female directors are more diligent, committed, philanthropically driven and 
make effective contribution to the firm performance [25]. Ballesteros et al. [63] also docu-
mented a positive relationship between the proportion of female directors and level of CSR 
disclosure. Female directors exhibit more philanthropic concern as compared to men [22, 64] 
enhancing information transparency and accountability [65].
In line with stakeholder theory, the authors in [66, 67] endorsed the view that women are 
socially oriented than men, develop effective stakeholder management and increase the board 
independence and thus social responsible behavior [45]. Furthermore, higher percentage of 
female directors on the board leads to the board independence and thus increases the prob-
ability of providing enhanced corporate environmental reporting [25]. On the basis of the 
above arguments about the monitoring potential of female directors and rationale offered 
by stakeholder theory, it can be asserted that female director’s commitment, independence, 
thoughtfulness and other attributes enable them to actively participate in corporate decision 
making concerning disclosure practices. Therefore, we hypothesized a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of female directors on the board and the level of envi-
ronmental reporting:
H
4
:The level of environmental reporting is positively related to the proportion of female directors on the 
board.
3.5. Audit committee independence and environmental reporting
The main purpose of board committees is to monitor the audit process, the auditor’s indepen-
dence, the internal control and accounting system, the nomination and remuneration of the 
board directors, thus ensuring a continuous communication between the external auditor and 
the company’s board [68]. Agency theory advocates the audit committee as an instrument of 
mitigating agency costs.
According to Ref. [69], the existence of an audit committee offers an ancillary internal control 
mechanism, likely to enhance the performance of a firm. More appreciably, audit committee 
with independent members empowers the committee to discharge its responsibilities impar-
tially and thus substantially contribute to the committee’s effectiveness [9]. According to the 
2013 Corporate Governance Code issued by the SECP, all listed companies in Pakistan are 
required to have an independent director as the chairman of board audit committee. There 
is dearth of empirical support regarding the relationship between environmental reporting 
practices of firms and independence of audit committee.
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Aburaya [70] found a positive relationship association between audit committee indepen-
dence and the reporting quality of certain environmental specific categories such as policies 
concerning environment, adherence with environmental legislations and other environ-
mental information. Nevertheless, in the context of voluntary disclosure [9, 12, 55, 71–73] 
documented the presence of a positive link between audit committee and the incurring inde-
pendence and the extent of voluntary reporting exhibited by the companies. They argued 
that board committees determine good corporate disclosure of information. In conclusion, 
the existence and independence of audit committee improves the transparency of corporate 
boards and is expected to guarantee that a company fulfills its social commitment includ-
ing the environmental commitment. Hence, it is hypothesized that the relationship between 
the presence and independence of audit committee and environmental disclosure will be 
positive:
H
5
:The level of environmental reporting is positively related to the existence and independence of audit 
committee.
3.6. Institutional ownership (ownership concentration) and environmental 
reporting
Ownership structure whether it is dispersed or concentrated is considered to be an important 
attribute of corporate governance [74]. Institutional ownership is the form of ownership con-
centration computed as the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders compris-
ing banks, pension funds, endowment funds, mutual funds and insurance companies, etc. 
[75]. It is generally argued that the efficacy and effectiveness of board is reduced due to the 
presence of institutional investors. Jensen and Meckling [42] argued that separation of own-
ership and control result in increasing demand of information disclosure by firms. Hence, 
it could be assumed that institutional shareholding decreases the probability of providing 
enhanced corporate environmental reporting.
Investors having larger stake in the firm confine the decision making power of the board, 
which reduces the board autonomy and activism [42, 75] whereas, the authors in [14, 54, 
61, 73] found no substantial association between the institutional ownership and the level 
of reporting. Some studies have found a negative association between institutional owner-
ship and corporate disclosures [74, 16]. According to the agency theory, institutional inves-
tors have strong incentives to monitor corporate disclosure practices and influence corporate 
values [12]. Consistent with the stakeholder theory, institutional investors demand more 
accountability and transparency and are positively associated with corporate voluntary dis-
closure practices including environmental disclosure [76]. In line with the theoretical expecta-
tions, Rao et al. [25] documented a positive association between institutional ownership and 
environmental reporting. They suggested that institutional investors are active owners and 
influence management and corporate value due to their large ownership stake in the firms. 
Based on the above discussion and rationale provided by agency and stakeholder theory, 
it could be anticipated that institutional shareholdings increase the likelihood of providing 
enhanced corporate environmental disclosure.
H
6
:The level of environmental reporting is positively related to the ownership concentration.
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The conceptual framework for the study shows the role of internal, external and control vari-
ables in affecting environmental reporting practices in the firm (Figure 1).
4. Methodology
The sample consists of 50 nonfinancial firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange that may affect 
the environment; forestry; the extractive and manufacture industry; food industry; construc-
tion industry; automobile industry; chemical industry; production and distribution of electric-
ity, oil, gas and water; engineering and transport and storage. Fifty companies are selected, 
using proportionate stratified random sampling technique from 19 sectors.
The annual report is the main source of data being utilized in the recent study to analyze 
the environmental reporting practices of firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange covering a 
period of 2014–2015. The selected time span is not an independent period compared to sys-
tematic factors in the economy (for details see Appendix 2 showing the major macro-economic 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
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factors) and no major economic event took place during this period. The reports have been 
used as the fundamental medium of reporting social and environmental activities of firms as 
evident from prior studies performed by the authors in [54, 61, 73].
4.1. Variables relevant for the study
4.1.1. Dependent variable (environmental reporting index (ERI))
The dependent variable, environmental reporting is computed by employing content analysis 
of the annual reports of the firms listed at PSX. Content analysis of environmental disclosure 
requires the development of categorization pattern and then deciding a set of rules for coding 
process, estimating and documenting the information being analyzed. First, a preliminary 
checklist containing anticipated environmental information items is organized. The checklist 
is then attuned to fit with the operational measures as documented by the guiding principles 
on environmental performance indicators and implication of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) that assist ascertaining environmental reporting in the annual reports.
Consequently, the final checklist is reckoned viable and rigorous in portraying environmental 
reporting practices in the annual and sustainability reports of Pakistani firms. The final check-
list comprises of 60 environmental information items classified into seven broadly identified 
categories, namely: (1) Environmental philosophy and strategy (7 items); (2) Environmental 
summary (6 items); (3) Initiatives concerning environmental reporting (6 items); (4) Governance 
structure and management system (6 item); (5) Credibility (9 items); (6) Environmental per-
formance Indicators (16 items) and (7) Environmental spending (10 items). Then, a coding 
method is used to allocate environmental information items in the annual reports to that of 
the scoring sheet/checklist employing premeditated decision rules.
Unweighted disclosure index technique is employed to compute the level of environmental 
reporting where the reporting of an item in the annual reports is coded (1) and non-disclosure 
is coded as (0). The disclosure model (unweighted environmental disclosure) thus computes 
the total disclosure (TD) score for a company as additive as follows:
  ERI =  ∑ 
i=1
 
60
di / nj (1)
where di is 1 if item is disclosed and 0 if item is not disclosed and nj is the maximum number 
of items for firms (nj ≤ 60). To compute specific firm score, total score awarded to a firm is 
divided by the highest possible score and then multiplied by 100 to get the percentage scores. 
The maximum possible score that a firm could get is 60 because the numbers of reporting 
items incorporating all the seven broad categories form a total score of 60. The average score 
is calculated as the percentage of the number of firms reporting a specific item to the total 
number of items.
4.1.2. Independent variables
Table 1 represents the details about the independent and control variables employed in the 
current study and techniques used for their operationalization.
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5. Results and discussion
To test the nature of the relationships proposed in this study, following sets of analyses are 
performed. These include descriptive statistics, correlation analyses, multiple regression anal-
yses, robustness tests including multicollinearity test and incremental regression analysis. 
The details of these tests are presented as follows.
5.1. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix
Table 2 depicts the descriptive statistics of different corporate governance attributes along 
with control variables investigated to analyze their impact on corporate environmental report-
ing system. The mean value for board independence which is computed by the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board is 40%, dem-
onstrating that 40% of the total board members are independent non-executive, aligned with 
the SECP Corporate Governance Code (2013). The mean value for board size is 8.58 reflecting 
that larger board has been a conventional practice among Pakistani firms. Moreover, the mean 
value for independence is 91.2% for the audit committee, imparting the relatively high degree 
of independence in audit committee. Meanwhile, the mean value for women representation 
on the board is only 6% with the maximum representation of around 33%. This shows that the 
firm’s board does not comprise of many female members. Concerning the structure of owner-
ship, it can be observed that the mean value for institutional ownership is 58% exhibiting the 
fact that institutional ownership represents the major form of block holdings. On the other 
hand, mean value for leverage and profitability ratio is 2.16 and 4.58% respectively.
Variables Operational definitions Symbol Expected sign
Independent variables
Board size Total number of directors on the board BS −ive
Board independence Percentage of independent non-executive directors to 
the total directors
BI +ive
CEO duality Dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO is also the 
chairman, 0 if not
DUAL −ive
Audit committee 
independence
Proportion of independent non-executive directors on 
the audit committee
ACI +ive
Female directors Proportion of female directors on the board FEMDIR +ive
Institutional ownership Percentage of total shares held by institutional 
investors
INSINV +ive
Control variables
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets SIZE +ive
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total equity LEV +ive
Profitability Return on asset ROA +ive
Table 1. Details relevant for the independent variables used in this study.
The Relationship between Environmental Reporting and Corporate Governance: Empirical…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75228
155
Some exploratory details about the components of the ERI and relevant score by each com-
pany are presented in Appendix 1.
5.2. Correlation analysis
Pairwise correlation coefficients exhibit relationship of corporate environmental reporting to 
all corporate governance attributes and firm specific variables used in the study and are pre-
sented in Table 3. Results indicate a positive association between the extent of environmental 
reporting and each of board size, independence of board, leverage, profitability and percent-
age of institutional investors whereas the CEO duality is negatively associated with the level 
of environmental reporting.
Variables ER1
BS 0.49**
BI 0.292*
DUAL −0.284*
ACI −0.027
FEMDIR −0.06
INSINV 0.507**
LEV 0.316*
ROA 0.324*
*5% significance.
**1% significance.
Table 3. Pairwise correlation.
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
ERI 43.4 0.00 95.0 27.2
BS 8.58 6.00 15.0 1.93
BI 40.0 25.0 85.1 8.63
DUAL 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.27
ACI 91.2 33.3 100 15.1
FEMDIR 6.22 0.00 33.3 9.05
INSINV 58.1 0.02 100 32.8
LEV 2.16 0.05 7.79 1.94
ROA 4.58 −20.2 24.9 9.70
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
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5.3. Multiple regressions analysis
The results by using multiple regression analysis presented in Table 4 are explained as follows.
5.3.1. Environmental reporting and board size
The first hypothesis (H1) proposed that board size is negatively related to the environmental reporting. Contrary to H1, the findings revealed a positive relationship between environmental reporting and the size of a board (p = 0.070). Hence H1 is not sustained. The finding is coherent 
with various studies [21, 22, 25, 27, 61] who deduced a direct connection between the size of a 
board and the level of environmental reporting, advocating that larger board acquires the needed 
skills and incurs more efficient reporting system to ensure sound environmental disclosure.
The result implies that management of the firms needs to have an optimal board size hav-
ing variety of members from national and multinational organization so that environmental 
reporting in these firms is sustained. The greater number of board members leads to have 
rigorous brainstorming and interchange of more ideas which results in economic integration 
of companies leading to higher globalization.
5.3.2. Environmental reporting and board independence
The second hypothesis (H2) implies that the proportion of independent non-executive direc-tors is positively and significantly linked with the extent of environmental reporting. The 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistics Probability VIF
C −0.7616 −1.9955 0.0528
BS — 0.0324 1.8593 0.0703 1.34
BI + 0.8537 2.6796 0.0106 1.13
DUAL — −0.1811 −1.8038 0.0788 1.13
ACI + −0.0401 −0.2231 0.8245 1.11
FEMDIR + 0.1144 0.3795 0.7063 1.11
INSINV — 0.3612 4.3243 0.0001 1.12
SIZE + 0.0414 0.9315 0.3572 1.29
LEV + 0.0334 2.2527 0.0298 1.25
ROA + 0.0078 2.7889 0.0081 1.12
R2 0.6369
Adjusted R2 0.5552
D-W statistics 2.0229
F-statistics 7.7963 & p = 0.000002
Table 4. Multiple regression results using (ERI) as the dependent variable.
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results revealed a positive and substantial linkage between environmental reporting and 
board independence (p = 0.010). Therefore, H2 is supported.
The results are in line with the stakeholder and agency theory argument that voluntary dis-
closure practices of the firms are more likely to improve with an increase in the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors. The outcome is in harmony with the inferences of many 
prior studies [20, 45, 63].
The result implies that the board independence (higher number of independent directors) 
from national and international organizations lead to independent thinking and incorpora-
tion of environmental friendly provisions in the firms. The management of the firms needs to 
have a higher number of independent directors resulting in higher financial integration and 
cross investment in the company leading to higher globalization and value for shareholders.
5.3.3. Environmental reporting and CEO duality
The third hypothesis (H
3
) suggests a negative relationship between the level of environmental 
reporting and role duality. Outcome of the H
3
 is in harmony with the agency theory (p = 0.078), 
endorsing that separate headship will bring about an improved social and environmental 
reporting related to the firms. The results of the study are in consonance with the stakeholder-
agency theory stating that the separate leadership structure is liable to offer requisite checks 
and balances and can enhance the efficacy of the board in controlling the management’s actions 
[58]. This reduces the probability of restraining information outflow and deterring unfavor-
able information/news from spreading to stakeholders. The result is coherent with [17, 45, 61].
The result implies that a single person holding both the positions is detrimental to the envi-
ronmental friendly practices and its reporting in the firm. The management of the firms needs 
to use nondual leadership structure to improve on the environmental reporting as the single 
dominant person does not let the board members think properly leading to less economic 
integration and globalization.
5.3.4. Environmental reporting and proportion of female directors
The fourth hypothesis (H4) suggests a positive association between the proportion of female directors on the board and the level of environmental reporting. Contrary to the expectation, 
the results of the model revealed the lack of any significant association among these variables 
(p = 0.7063).
5.3.5. Environmental reporting and audit committee independence
The fifth hypothesis (H5) recommends a positive and a significant association between inde-pendence of audit committee and the level of environmental reporting. The audit commit-
tee independence appeared to have no significant association with environmental reporting 
(p = 0.8245) leading to the rejection of H5. The result is in line with previous evidence provided 
by the authors in [16, 24].
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5.3.6. Environmental reporting and institutional ownership
The final result depicts that institutional investors have a positive and significant impact 
on environmental reporting (p = 0.0001) leading to the acceptance of H6. The finding is con-
sistent with various studies [12, 25] who deduced a direct connection among institutional 
ownership and that of environmental reporting, advocating that institutional investors are 
active owners and influence management and corporate value due to their large owner-
ship stake in the firms. The result shows a positive and constructive role by the block-
holders leading to higher level of environmental reporting and economic freedom and 
globalization. The management of the firm needs to have a healthy relationship with the 
institutional shareholding so the level of environmental reporting in the firm is improved. 
The summary of the results for the hypotheses testing are presented in Table 5.
The results for the control variables suggest a considerable positive connection among envi-
ronmental reporting and each of leverage and profitability. The positive connection between 
leverage and environmental reporting is reported by the authors in [12, 55]. The profitability 
is significant at 1% level of significance advocating that highly profitable firms disclose addi-
tional information regarding environmental activities in their annual reports. Results are con-
sistent with the studies of [4, 10, 18] who deduced a significant positive connection between 
environmental reporting and profitability.
As discussed before, the robustness tests for the study include multicollinearity and incre-
mental regression analysis. The values of VIF vary from 1.11 to 1.34 showing a lack of substan-
tial multicollinearity problem in our analysis [77]. The results for the incremental regression 
suggest that removal of the institutional investors’ fraction leads to substantial fall in the 
value for the R-Squared (from 63 to 46%). The outcome shows that percentage of institutional 
investors is the most significant independent variable in affecting the level of environmental 
disclosure. The other diagnostics of the model show that the value for the R-Squared is 0.636 
which reveals that 63.6% of the variations in the dependent variable are explained by the 
independent variables included in the model.
Hypotheses Status
H
1
: Board size negatively impacts the level of ER. Rejected
H
2
: Board independence positively impacts the level of ER. Accepted
H
3
: CEO duality negatively impacts the level of ER. Accepted
H
4
: Higher percentage of women on the board positively impacts the level of ER. Rejected
H
5
: Audit committee independence positively impacts the level of ER. Rejected
H
6
: Institutional ownership positively impacts the level of ER. Accepted
Table 5. Results for the hypotheses testing.
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6. Concluding remarks, limitations and further scope of the study
The study primarily intends to scrutinize the association among the certain attributes of cor-
porate governance and the environmental reporting practices of companies in Pakistan for a 
period of 2014–2015. The findings depicted a substantial connection among environmental 
reporting practices and attributes of corporate governance. The results highlighted that larger 
board size, higher proportion of nonexecutive independent directors, partition of the twin 
positions of the CEO & chairman and institutional ownership (ownership concentration) is 
related with enhanced environmental disclosure in Pakistan. The overall results supported 
the corresponding theoretical contention of agency theory and stakeholder theory that sound 
corporate governance practices serve as monitoring and accountability catalyst and eventu-
ally result in more environmental disclosure.
The results of the study suggest that the firms should use the highlighted instruments as pow-
erful tools and be encouraged to produce climate change policy and environmental reports 
on regular basis to manifest their commitment to sustainable development. The limitations of 
the study suggest that a longitudinal research with large sample size and a relative analysis 
of Pakistan with developed market would offer more insights regarding the role of corporate 
governance practices in affecting environmental reporting.
A. Appendix 1
Overall extent of environmental reporting of firms.
S# Number of firms 
reported
Percentage
A. Vision and strategy
1 A declaration of firm environmental performance in CEO’s message 31 62
2 A description of environmental philosophy, values, policies and 
environmental ethics
38 76
3 A narration of a proper managerial systems for environmental 
operations and risk
19 38
4 A declaration of the regular reviews and assessment of firm’s 
environmental performance
17 34
5 Environmental standards or targets 37 74
6 An announcement of the measurable objectives regarding future 
environmental performance
25 50
7 An indication of specific innovations or latest technologies regarding 
environment
19 38
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S# Number of firms 
reported
Percentage
B. Environmental profile
8 A comment regarding the firm’s adherence with particular 
environmental principles or targets
26 52
9 Performance against environmental targets 25 50
10 Measures taken to monitor compliance with policy statement 21 42
11 A brief summary of the impact of firm’s activities on environment 31 62
12 A review of how the firm’s activities or products effect the surrounding 
environment
20 40
13 A comparative analysis of the environmental performance to the other 
industries
13 26
C. Environmental initiatives
14 A proper statement of employees training sessions to create awareness 
on environmental issues
29 58
15 A response plan in emergency actions 39 78
16 Internal awards as recognition of environmental performance 8 16
17 Internal audits of firm’s environmental actions 18 36
18 Environmental certification by internal body 18 36
19 Community participation or environmental donations 42 84
D. Governance structure & management systems
20 Department or managerial position for environmental management or 
controlling pollution
21 42
21 Presence of CSR or environmental committee on the board 14 28
22 A set of principles for suppliers or customers concerning 
environmental practices
13 26
23 Stakeholder participation in deciding environmental strategies 25 50
24 Executive reward is allied with environmental conduct 0 0
25 Training sessions for raising environmental awareness 34 68
E. Credibility
26 A declaration of an environmental/ sustainability report 16 32
27 Adherence GRI guiding principles 23 46
28 Independent and regular audits on environmental operations or 
environmental certification by third party
18 36
29 Certification of products in connection with environmental influence 27 54
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S# Number of firms 
reported
Percentage
30 Environmental recognition awards by external body or nomination in a 
sustainability catalog
19 38
31 Stakeholders participation in environmental reporting process 20 40
32 Involvement in voluntary activities regarding environment 43 86
33 Involvement in the operations of specific industry to enhance 
environmental performance
22 44
34 Involvement in other organizations to enhance environmental 
performance
31 62
F. Environmental performance indicators
35 EPl regarding energy consumption or efficiency 34 68
36 EPl regarding water consumption or efficiency 24 48
37 EPl regarding greenhouse discharge 22 44
38 EPl regarding air discharge other than green house 23 46
39 EPl regarding toxic release inventory 19 38
40 EPl regarding additional discharges or emissions 15 30
41 EPl regarding waste management 34 68
42 EPl regarding biodiversity and resource conservation 30 60
43 EPl regarding impacts of industrial products on environment 20 40
44 EPl regarding compliance with environmental targets 13 26
45 Equipment for waste water treatment 25 50
46 Recycling of waste material 28 56
47 Land renovation and forestation plans 19 38
48 Pollution management of industrial operations 36 72
49 Preservation Anti-litter operations 20 40
50 Introduction of new production techniques to lessen pollution 24 48
G. Environmental spending
51 A review of monetary savings from environment programs 0 0
52 Environmental Policy 7 14
53 Previous and current spending on effluence control facilities and 
apparatus
16 32
54 Previous and current operating expenses on effluence control 
apparatus and facilities
8 16
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Environmental reporting items not reported by any sample company.
Ranking of companies on the basis of environmental disclosure scores.
SI no. Environmental reporting items
24 Executive reward is allied with environmental conduct
51 A review of monetary savings from environment program
58 Estimation of contingent obligations
60 Penalties regarding environmental affairs
S# Company name No. of items 
disclosed
% Ranking
1 K-Electric Limited 57 95.00 1
2 I.C.I. Pakistan Limited 53 88.33 2
3 Murree Brewery Company Limited 51 85.00 3
4 Atlas Honda Limited 50 83.33 4
5 Fauji Fertilizer Company Limited 49 81.67 5
6 Engro Fertilizers Limited 48 80.00 6
7 Siemens Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited 47 78.33 7
8 GlaxoSmithKline (Pakistan) Limited 46 76.67 8
9 Pakistan Refinery Limited 45 75.00 9
S# Number of firms 
reported
Percentage
55 Future assessment of expense for effluence control apparatus and 
facilities
5 10
56 Funding for effluence control apparatus or facilities 34 68
57 Estimated pattern of potential environmental spending 7 14
58 Estimation of contingent obligations 0 0
59 Expenditure on R& D, technologies or innovations to improve 
environmental efficiency
24 48
60 Penalties regarding environmental concerns 0 0
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S# Company name No. of items 
disclosed
% Ranking
10 Pakistan International Airlines Corporation 45 75.00 9
11 Unilever Pakistan Foods Limited 44 73.33 11
12 Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited 43 71.67 12
13 Nestle Pakistan Limited 42 70.00 13
14 Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited 40 66.67 14
15 Engro Foods Limited 40 66.67 14
16 Hub Power Company Limited 36 60.00 16
17 Pakistan National Shipping Corporation Limited 34 56.67 17
18 Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited 32 53.33 18
19 Fecto Cement Limited 31 51.67 19
20 Service Industries Limited 30 50.00 20
21 Treet Corporation Limited 29 48.33 21
22 Kohinoor Industries Limited 28 46.67 22
23 Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Limited 27 45.00 23
24 Nishat Mills Limited 26 43.33 24
25 Pakistan Cables Limited 25 41.67 25
26 Bata Pakistan Limited 24 40.00 26
27 Bannu Woolen Mills Limited 23 38.33 27
28 Millat Tractors Limited 23 38.33 27
29 Oil and Gas Development Company Limited 42 70.00 29
30 Dawood Hercules Corporation Limited 21 35.00 30
31 Pakistan Services Limited 20 33.33 31
32 National Foods Limited 19 31.67 32
33 Cherat Packaging Limited 18 30.00 33
34 Aisha Steel Mills Limited 17 28.33 34
35 Berger Paints Pakistan Limited 16 26.67 35
36 Pakistan Paper Products Limited 13 21.67 36
37 Rupali Polyester Limited 12 20.00 37
38 Shabbir Tiles and Ceramics Limited 11 18.33 38
Globalization164
B. Appendix 2
Author details
Mehwish Naseer and Kashif Rashid*
*Address all correspondence to: mkrashid@ciit.net.pk
Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS University Islamabad, Abbottabad 
Campus, Abbottabad, Pakistan
Years Inflation rate% GDP (annual growth rate)% Interest rate %
2012 9.73 3.8 7.98
2013 7.68 3.71 7.17
2014 7.23 4.1 7.26
2015 2.53 4.1 5.97
2016 3.76 4.5 4.83
Source: Economic Survey and other web sources.
S# Company name No. of items 
disclosed
% Ranking
39 Mitchells Fruit Farms Limited 10 16.67 39
40 Dewan Farooque Motors Limited 9 15.00 40
41 Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited 8 13.33 41
42 Adam Sugar Mills Limited 8 13.33 41
43 Jubilee Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited 7 11.67 43
44 Gadoon Textile Mills Limited 6 10.00 44
45 Dewan Cement Limited 5 8.33 45
46 Shield Corporation Limited 5 8.33 45
47 Dawood Lawrancepur Limited 4 6.67 47
48 Dewan Textile Mills Limited 3 5.00 48
49 Bilal Fibers Limited 2 3.33 49
50 Olympia Textile Mills Limited 0 0.00 50
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